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SUMMARY: The debate continues about the relationship between auditor tenure and
audit quality in spite of extensive empirical evidence examining audit failures, earnings
management, and the issuance of auditor’s opinions. Most recent evidence suggests
that long auditor tenure does not have a negative impact on audit quality. However,
most of the available evidence has been accumulated based on publicly listed com-
panies in the U.S. We examine the effect of auditor tenure on audit quality for private
companies in Belgium, an environment where we believe auditor tenure is more likely
to have a negative effect on audit quality. We use the likelihood of an auditor issuing
a going concern opinion as an indicator of audit quality. Using a sample of stressed
bankrupt companies, and stressed nonbankrupt companies, the results indicate that
auditors do not become less independent over time nor do they become better at
predicting bankruptcy. In balance, the evidence for tenure either increasing or decreas-
ing quality is weak.
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INTRODUCTION
T
he question of whether audit quality is affected by the length of time that an auditor
serves a client has received extensive attention from researchers. However, ongoing
interest in the issue suggests that this question has not been completely answered
by extant research. In this paper, we provide additional insight into the debate by examining
the impact of auditor tenure on the likelihood an auditor issues a going concern opinion.
Prior research on the relationship between auditor tenure and audit quality has mainly
focused on public ﬁrms in the U.S. While these studies have had mixed results, the majority
of recent studies seem to refute the assertion that a long auditor-client relationship nega-
tively affects audit quality (e.g., Ghosh and Moon 2005; Myers et al. 2003; Geiger and
Raghunandan 2002). We add to this literature by examining the issue in an environment
where extended auditor tenure is more likely to lead to a potential loss of audit quality.
To this end, we focus on private ﬁrms in Belgium. This environment is of interest
because private ﬁrms constitute the majority of the European Union economy and the Fourth
EU Directive requires that private ﬁrms meeting certain size criteria must have a statutory
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audit. Thus, extensive data on private ﬁrms is available to study the issue at hand. Fur-
thermore, because auditing standards on the issue of going concern reporting were less well
developed at the time than in the U.S., auditors had greater ﬂexibility in deciding which
company warranted a going concern opinion. Finally, the economic exposure is lower for
an auditor who fails to issue a going concern opinion when a client goes bankrupt, so the
auditor trade-off between risk of loss of reputation due to an incorrect reporting choice and
risk of client loss is likely to be different than in other audit markets (e.g., Krishnan and
Krishnan 1996). Consequently, auditors of private companies may be more susceptible to
a loss of independence as a result of extended tenure.
We measure audit quality by examining the likelihood of an auditor issuing a going
concern report. We use a sample of 618 audit reports from Belgian companies, divided
evenly between stressed companies that went bankrupt and stressed companies that sur-
vived. We presume that a decrease in audit quality is indicated by an increase in the
likelihood that an auditor does not issue a going concern opinion when a company subse-
quently goes bankrupt, or an increase in the likelihood that an auditor issues a going concern
opinion to a company that survives. The results of our study show that the decision of the
auditor to issue a going concern opinion is not affected by tenure in the bankrupt sample.
In the nonbankrupt sample, we ﬁnd some evidence of a negative association between auditor
tenure and the issuance of a going concern opinion. Hence, Type I error rates (i.e., issuing
a going concern opinion to a company that does not ﬁle bankruptcy in the following year)
appear to be lower when auditor tenure is longer.
These results contribute to the literature in three ways. First, we ﬁnd no evidence that
auditor tenure is negatively associated with audit quality, even though the setting may be
conducive to a loss of auditor independence. Second, we ﬁnd that long tenure reduces the
likelihood that the auditor issues a false going concern signal. Third, our results contribute
to the limited but growing literature on ﬁnancial reporting quality and auditing in private
ﬁrms (e.g., Ball and Shivakumar 2005; Chaney et al. 2004). The remainder of this paper
is organized as follows: In the next section, we provide an overview of the existing literature
on auditor tenure and pose our speciﬁc research questions. In the third section, we describe
the main characteristics of the Belgian audit market and regulation on going concern re-
porting. In the fourth section, we describe our research method and data collection. The
ﬁfth section reports our overall results, followed with extensive supplementary and sensi-
tivity analysis in the sixth section. Finally, we conclude with a general discussion of our
results.
PRIOR RESEARCH AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS
DeAngelo (1981) notes that audit quality consists of two components: auditor com-
petence and auditor independence. Auditor tenure can have a negative impact on either.
Long auditor tenure may increase auditor competence as the auditor can base audit decisions
on extensive client knowledge that has developed over time, or it may undermine auditor
independence as lengthy tenure fosters closeness between management and the auditor.
Short auditor tenure may undermine auditor competence since the auditor knows less about
a company in the early years of an audit, but it may also undermine auditor independence
since auditors will wish to retain a new client long enough to recoup the costs of the initial
audit setup or a lowball fee (Dye 1991). That is, deterioration in audit quality in a shortThe Relationship between Auditor Tenure and Audit Quality 115
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tenure audit may be due to either lack of competence or loss of independence, while a loss
in quality in a long tenure audit is most likely due to a loss of independence.1
In this paper, we conjecture that if auditor tenure negatively affects audit quality, it will
be most observable in an environment where auditor incentives favor avoiding client dis-
putes so as to avoid the loss of the client. We feel Belgium provides an appropriate envi-
ronment for our tests because most companies are privately owned and do not have a broad
shareholder base to which they are accountable. Also, auditing standards in Belgium at the
time of the study were somewhat ambiguous about the auditor’s obligation to issue a going
concern report. Finally, Belgium has a low rate of litigation against auditors. Indeed, Bel-
gium is quite unlike the U.S. where auditors face a risk of costly litigation if they fail to
issue a going concern opinion to a ﬁrm that ﬁles bankruptcy in the following year. Several
studies in the U.S. provide empirical support for this; for example, Palmrose (1987) and
St. Pierre and Anderson (1984) ﬁnd that half of all litigation against auditors is associated
with client bankruptcy and/or severe ﬁnancial stress.2
Researchers have used various measures of audit quality to examine its relationship
with auditor tenure, including the incidence of audit failures, the likelihood of issuing
modiﬁed or qualiﬁed opinions, and the extent of earnings management as measured by
accruals. The extent of earnings management is generally lower when auditor tenure is
longer (Ghosh and Moon 2005; Myers et al. 2003; Johnson et al. 2002). Also, there is
mixed evidence on the incidence of outright audit failures as a function of auditor tenure
(Myers et al. 2005; Carcello and Nagy 2004; Casterella et al. 2004; Walker et al. 2001;
and Raghunathan et al. 1994). Finally, the evidence concerning the relationship between
modiﬁed auditor reports and auditor tenure is mixed. Geiger and Raghunandan (2002)
examine going concern opinions for bankrupt ﬁrms in the U.S. They ﬁnd that auditors are
less likely to issue a going concern opinion during the initial years of engagement but not
in later years, contrary to the expressed concern that a long auditor-client relationship
negatively affects audit quality. Other research on the relationship between auditor tenure
and audit opinions has yielded conﬂicting results (e.g., Vanstraelen 2000; Levinthal and
Fichman 1988).
Given the public visibility of corporate bankruptcies and the general expectation by the
public and regulators that auditors will serve as a warning system to investors, many con-
strue the failure to issue a going concern opinion prior to bankruptcy as an audit failure.
While the issuance of a going concern opinion is an imperfect predictor of subsequent
bankruptcy, we presume that a decrease in the likelihood of issuing a going concern opinion
when a ﬁrm subsequently goes bankrupt is an indication of reduced audit quality (Type II
errors). Since the preponderance of prior research suggests that lengthy auditor tenure may
not reduce audit quality, for stressed companies we expect that an auditor will not be less
likely to issue a going concern opinion when tenure is longer. This leads to our ﬁrst
hypothesis:
1 It is possible that long tenure may lead to a loss of auditor competence in some ways. For example, the auditor
may use less experienced or less expert personnel on an engagement where risk is perceived to be low due to
prior experience with the client. If audit quality suffers as a result, one can argue that this is due to a loss of
competence, not a loss of independence. However, if the overall comfort level of the auditor is attributable to
being ‘‘close’’ to the client, the underlying cause of any auditor error may actually be attributable to a loss of
professional skepticism and due care, which suggests an implicit loss of independence.
2 Carcello and Palmrose (1994) report that auditors are named as defendants 74 percent of the time when litigation
followed client bankruptcy. The importance of litigation on auditor reporting behavior is also shown by Geiger
and Raghunandan (2001) reporting a lower frequency of going concern opinions after passage of the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, a law that generally lowers auditor litigation risk.116 Knechel and Vanstraelen
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H1: Increased auditor tenure does not reduce auditor quality as measured by the
likelihood that an auditor fails to issue a going concern report for a company
that subsequently goes bankrupt.
Conventional arguments about audit quality in short tenure engagements tend to focus
on the competence issue while ignoring the potential loss of independence that is associated
with lowballing and the desire to retain a client (Dye 1991; Summer 1998). However, an
increase in the likelihood of an auditor issuing a going concern opinion to a company that
subsequently does not ﬁle bankruptcy (i.e., Type I error) can be reﬂective of a decrease in
auditor competence. While this issue is probably less important than the opposite problem
(Type II error), a going concern opinion can affect market valuations, i.e., there are wealth
distribution implications for giving a going concern opinion to a company that survives
(Chen and Church 1996; Jones 1996). In their study, Geiger and Raghunandan (2002) only
focus on bankrupt companies, so they were unable to infer the effect of auditor tenure on
Type I errors. In an earlier study, Carcello and Neal (2000) considered the relationship
between auditor tenure and audit reports for ﬁnancially distressed companies but did not
speciﬁcally address the issue of whether auditor tenure affected auditor Type I error rates.
Therefore, we extend Geiger and Raghunandan (2002) and Carcello and Neal (2000) by
examining the nature of auditor decision errors for a nonbankrupt sample. Extrapolating
from the prior literature on auditor tenure, we expect that an extended auditor-client rela-
tionship will improve the ability of the auditor to discern when a company is truly at risk
of entering bankruptcy. This leads to our second hypothesis:
H2: Increased auditor tenure improves auditor quality as measured by the like-
lihood that an auditor does not issue a going concern report for a company
that does not subsequently go bankrupt.
BELGIAN AUDIT MARKET AND REGULATION ON
GOING CONCERN REPORTING
Belgium differs from Anglo-American countries in terms of accounting regulation, the
audit market, corporate ﬁnance, and general legal environment. In contrast to the U.S. and
the U.K., ﬁnancial reporting in Belgium is strongly inﬂuenced by corporate law and taxation
and is creditor-oriented (Jorissen and Van Oostveldt 2001). Furthermore, banks, other ﬁ-
nancial institutions, and the government play a key role in corporate ﬁnance in Belgium.
Leuz et al. (2003) classify Belgium as an insider economy with a less-developed stock
market, concentrated ownership, weak investor rights, and strong legal enforcement (see
also La Porta et al. 1998, 1997). The Belgian audit market also differs from the U.S. and
U.K. audit market as auditors are appointed for a term of three years, which can be renewed
without limitation for additional three-year periods.
Legal action against an auditor in Belgium can be undertaken by the client company,
its shareholders, or any interested third party up to ﬁve years after the issue of the auditor’s
report. Belgium has a proportional liability system, i.e., liability is placed upon the defen-
dants according to their contribution to the damage. There is no possibility to reduce the
auditor’s liability either by a liability cap or by contract. However, compared with the U.S.
and U.K., the Belgian audit market is characterized by a low risk of litigation (Gaeremynck
and Willekens 2003). This suggests that incentives work against an auditor issuing a goingThe Relationship between Auditor Tenure and Audit Quality 117
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concern opinion in cases that are open to interpretation, suggesting that a tenure effect—
if one exists—could be stronger in Belgium than in Anglo-Saxon countries.3
The objective of bankruptcy in Belgium is liquidation. Article 437 of the Belgian Code
of Mercantile Law deﬁnes bankruptcy as: ‘‘Any businessman who ceases to pay and whose
credit is faltering is in a state of bankruptcy.’’ The period between suspension of payment
and declaration of bankruptcy is referred to as the suspect period and may not exceed six
months. Bankruptcy is a means of collective conﬁscation for the beneﬁt of creditors of the
insolvent debtor, whereby, creditors are proportionally compensated with the assets held at
the time of bankruptcy. Bankruptcy is declared by the Court of Commerce. Bankruptcy
proceedings may be initiated by the insolvent debtor, the creditors, or the Court of Com-
merce if three conditions are met:
● The insolvent debtor is a merchant;
● The merchant has suspended payments (i.e., is unable to pay debts);
● The creditworthiness of the merchant is faltering (i.e., the debtor is unable to obtain
new lines of credit and/or respite of payment has been refused).
This indicates that the legal discontinuity decision as laid down in bankruptcy law is
essentially a question of liquidity, namely cession of payment, which usually goes hand in
hand with insolvency.4
During the period of our sample (1992–1996), audit regulation related to going concern
problems consisted of a short circular letter issued by the Institute of Auditors outlining
the following recommended practice:
If the auditor ascertains serious circumstances that may jeopardize the ﬁnancial stability of
the company, he should make sure that the Board of Directors of the company is aware of
the gravity of the situation. If the report of the Board of Directors does not correctly inform
about the ﬁnancial position of the company and the auditor is not certain that the company
will be able to continue its operations until the end of the following ﬁscal year, a qualiﬁed
opinion may be called for. (Belgian Institute of Auditors, Circular letters, C.007/1982).
The ﬂexibility of this nonbinding reporting requirement provides further motivation for
addressing the relationship between auditor tenure and audit quality in this setting. The
absence of a strict regulatory requirement to issue a going concern opinion increases the
likelihood that auditors may be willing to compromise their independence. However, in
spite of the limited requirements for Belgian auditors, the decision is not considered lightly
by the profession as evidenced by a quote from a former chairman of the Belgian auditing
profession: ‘‘GCO is a very sensitive decision for auditors. Every warning could mean the
end for the company’’ (De Financieel Economische Tijd 1996). Vanstraelen (2003) studied
auditor switching and client bankruptcy following a going concern opinion in Belgium. Her
results support the hypothesis that going concern opinions signiﬁcantly increase the prob-
ability of bankruptcy in Belgium. Furthermore, it appears that clients are four times more
likely to switch auditors at the end of the mandate term if they receive a going concern
opinion in the ﬁnal year of the term, as compared to a going concern opinion received in
the ﬁrst two years of the mandate.
3 The Disciplinary Board of the Belgian Institute of Auditors can also impose professional sanctions if an auditor
is found to have performed a substandard audit or violated independence rules.
4 If a company has ceased to pay, Belgian law offers an alternative to bankruptcy called a creditors’ composition.
This is an agreement between a bona ﬁde yet unfortunate merchant and his creditors with the speciﬁc purpose
of avoiding bankruptcy.118 Knechel and Vanstraelen
Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, May 2007
RESEARCH METHOD AND DATA
Data
We use a sample of 618 private Belgian companies for our empirical analysis, evenly
divided between (1) companies that are ﬁnancially stressed and went bankrupt and (2)
companies that are ﬁnancially stressed but did not go bankrupt. Prior research has dem-
onstrated the importance of conditioning analysis of going concern reporting on the pres-
ence of ﬁnancial distress (e.g., Mutchler et al. 1997; Hopwood et al. 1994; McKeown et
al. 1991). We considered a company to be ﬁnancially stressed if it exhibits one of the
following criteria: (1) an operational loss, (2) a bottom line loss, (3) negative retained
earnings in the current or previous two years, or (4) negative working capital in the previous
two years (Hopwood et al. 1994; Mutchler et al. 1997).
Our sample was developed starting with the entire population of bankrupt Belgian
companies from the period 1992–1996 deemed to be ‘‘large’’ under Belgian guidelines.5
There were 720 bankrupt private companies in the period 1992–1996 for which a statutory
audit was required. No listed Belgian company went bankrupt during that period. For
companies belonging to the same afﬁliated group, only the parent company is included. We
dropped 219 bankrupt companies for which the audit report was not available and 42
bankrupt companies belonging to the same group. We also dropped 150 bankrupt compa-
nies, which had no signs of ﬁnancial distress, had missing ﬁnancial data, for which an
appropriate match could not be identiﬁed, or had zero sales. This process yielded a sample
of 309 bankrupt private ﬁrms. We subsequently matched each ﬁnancially stressed bankrupt
company in our sample with a ﬁnancially stressed nonbankrupt company (i.e., one that did
not ﬁle for bankruptcy in the upcoming year) based on size (total assets), industry (4-digit
NACE-code), and year (Schwartz and Menon 1985). This resulted in a total sample of 618
ﬁrms.6 Data was collected for the sample companies with the cooperation of the Belgian
National Bank, which maintains archives of ﬁnancial reports.
Estimation Models
For the primary analysis presented in this paper, we deﬁne GCO as the dependent
variable:
GCO  dummy variable with a value of 1 if a going concern opinion is issued,
0 otherwise.
We use logistic regression to estimate the following model to predict the likelihood of an
auditor issuing a going concern report:
GCO     LNSALES   LAG   DSCORE   BIG6   AGE 01 2 3 4 5
  TENURE  ε 6
5 During the period 1992–1996, a company was considered to be large if it either had more than 100 employees
or if it exceeded more than one of the following criteria: (1) number of employees is 50; (2) annual turnover
(excluding VAT) is BFr.145m; (3) balance sheet total is BFr.100m. In 1996, the applicable size criteria were:
turnover—BFr.200m, and balance sheet total—BFr.100m. While large by Belgian standards, these companies
would still be deemed to be small to moderate compared to publicly listed companies in the U.S.
6 Five of the nonbankrupt ﬁrms subsequently went bankrupt more than a year after our test period. As a sensitivity
test, our analysis was redone excluding these ﬁve observations. As described in Section 6, the results are the
same as our primary results.The Relationship between Auditor Tenure and Audit Quality 119
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where we deﬁne the following control variables:
LNSALES  natural log of sales. Since larger companies are less likely to go bankrupt, we
expect a negative coefﬁcient for this variable. Furthermore, prior research has
shown that the likelihood that an auditor issues a GCO is inversely related to
client size (e.g., Mutchler et al. 1997; Louwers 1998);
LAG  dummy variable with a value of 1 if the number of months between the ﬁscal
year end and the date of the general annual meeting of shareholders exceeds
six months (the legal maximum), 0 otherwise. Belgian law requires that the
shareholders’ meeting be held within six months of the end of the ﬁscal year.
Delaying the shareholders’ meeting is typically an indication that a company
has problems, so we expect a positive coefﬁcient for LAG. Note, GMDELAY
(used for descriptive purposes) is the actual time lapse, in months, between
the end of the ﬁscal year and the general meeting of shareholders;
DSCORE  general discriminant score of a standardized bankruptcy prediction model de-
veloped for Belgian companies.7 Lower values indicate a greater likelihood
of bankruptcy, and we expect a negative coefﬁcient for this variable. The D-
score is calculated from a general multiple linear discriminant model specif-
ically developed for Belgian companies and consists of the following ratios:
accumulated proﬁt (loss) and reserves/total liabilities, taxes and social security
charges/short-term external liabilities, cash/restricted current assets, work in
progress and ﬁnished goods/restricted current assets, short-term ﬁnancial
debts/short-term external liabilities;
BIG6  dummy variable with a value of 1 if the audit ﬁrm is a member of the Big 6,
0 otherwise. Due to their reputation concerns (DeAngelo 1981), we expect
that Big 6 ﬁrms are more likely to issue going concern opinions, thus, we
expect a positive coefﬁcient; and
AGE  age of the company measured in years. Older companies have indicated their
general ability to survive so they are less likely to suffer ﬁnancial distress or
to receive going concern opinions from the auditor. We expect a negative
coefﬁcient for AGE.
We use two proxies for the length of the auditor-client relationship (TENURE) as our
experimental variable of interest:
TENYRS  length of the auditor client relationship in years; and
TEN3  dummy variable with a value of 1 if auditor tenure is more than three years, 0
otherwise.8
7 The D-score of the general bankruptcy prediction model has a prediction accuracy of 82.8 percent for failing
companies when using the optimal cut-off point of D-score  0.1304 (Ooghe et al. 1995).
8 We use a three-year cutoff because it is the most commonly used period in other research (e.g., Johnson et al.
2002). Additionally, due to the unique institutional aspects of the Belgian market for audit services, contracts
between an auditor and a client are always for three years and are noncancellable. The three-year period is
referred to as a ‘‘mandate’’ and can be renewed between the client and the auditor at the end of each three-year
period. Consequently, we deﬁne short tenure as an engagement that is within the ﬁrst mandate period (three
years or less) because the client cannot terminate the auditor during that period.120 Knechel and Vanstraelen
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We estimate the model for GCO using the sample of stressed bankrupt companies and
the sample of stressed nonbankrupt companies separately. For the sample of bankrupt com-
panies, based on H1, we expect that the coefﬁcient for TEN3 or TENYRS is not different
from zero, which would indicate that increased auditor tenure does not reduce audit quality
in the sense that long-tenured auditors are not less likely to issue a going concern opinion
for soon-to-be bankrupt ﬁrms. If long-tenured auditors are more likely (positive coefﬁcient
for TEN3 or TENYRS) to issue a going concern opinion for soon-to-be bankrupt ﬁrms, this
would be evidence of long tenure resulting in a lower Type II error. For the sample of
stressed nonbankrupt companies, based on H2 we expect a negative coefﬁcient for TEN3
or TENYRS which would indicate that long-tenured auditors are less likely to issue a going
concern opinion for surviving ﬁrms, resulting in a lower Type I error rate.
PRIMARY RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics for all variables used in this study are reported in Table 1. Results
are presented for all bankrupt and nonbankrupt ﬁrms, and then further divided into four
categories: (1) bankrupt, no going concern opinion, (2) bankrupt, going concern opinion,
(3) nonbankrupt, no going concern opinion, and (4) nonbankrupt, going concern opin-
ion. As would be expected, bankrupt companies were almost three times as likely to receive
a going concern opinion (36 percent versus 13 percent). On average, the two groups of
companies are very similar in size (based on sales). A nonbankrupt company is more likely
to be audited by a Big 6 ﬁrm (29 percent versus 19 percent). As expected, bankrupt com-
panies have a lower DSCORE (1.13 versus 0.41, with a more negative score indicating
greater ﬁnancial weakness), longer delays in holding a shareholder meeting (GMDELAY;
5.72 versus 5.27 months), are more likely to miss the 6-month cutoff for shareholder meet-
ings (15 percent versus 4 percent), and are younger (19.96 versus 23.59 years). Bankrupt
and nonbankrupt ﬁrms are statistically different on all dimensions except size.
Looking at differences within bankrupt ﬁrms, we see that a ﬁrm that received a going
concern report was generally smaller (319,692/447,124), ﬁnancially weaker (1.76/
0.78), more likely to be audited by a Big 6 ﬁrm (24.1 percent/16.4 percent), younger
(18.7/20.7 years), had a slightly longer delay in the shareholder meeting (5.9/5.6 months),
and was more likely to have a shareholder meeting later than required (21.4 percent/12.1
percent). This pattern of results is consistent with our expectations. Within the nonbankrupt
sample, a ﬁrm that received a going concern report was generally smaller (232,593/
438,372), ﬁnancially weaker (2.95/0.04), more likely to be audited by a Big 6 ﬁrm (41
percent/28 percent), slightly younger (22.2/23.8 years), and had a longer delay in the
shareholder meeting (5.7/5.2 months). Again, this pattern of results is consistent with our
expectations. Table 2 further shows that in our sample the incidence of a Type I error in
the nonbankrupt sample is 13.0 percent, while the incidence of a Type II error in the
bankrupt sample is 64.0 percent (i.e., 1.00–0.36).
Regarding the tenure variables, bankrupt companies have shorter auditor tenure (3.28
versus 4.00 years). The transformation of tenure into a dummy variable reﬂects a similar
relationship: bankrupt companies are less likely to have auditor tenure in excess of three
years (43.6 percent versus 60.0 percent). Transforming our raw data into our test variable
indicates that approximately 50 percent of the companies have auditor tenure of three years
or less (i.e., they are in the ﬁrst mandate period).9 Within the bankrupt sample, auditor
9 The requirement that nonlisted companies be audited in Belgium was introduced in 1985. This puts an effective


























































































































GCO Mean: 0.36 Mean: 0.13 6.97***
SALES Mean: 406,334 Mean: 319,692 Mean: 447,124 Mean: 400,935 Mean: 232,593 Mean: 438,372 Mean: 411,734 0.15
LNSALES Mean: 12.11 Mean: 11.907 Mean: 12.238 Mean: 12.11 Mean: 11.80 Mean: 12.15 Mean: 12.11 0.07
DSCORE Mean: 0.77 Mean: 1.76 Mean: 0.778 Mean: 1.13 Mean: 2.95 Mean: 0.042 Mean: 0.41 3.98***
BIG 6 Mean: 0.245 Mean: 0.241 Mean: 0.164 Mean: 0.19 Mean: 0.41 Mean: 0.28 Mean: 0.29 3.09***
AGE Mean: 21.77 Mean: 18.70 Mean: 20.68 Mean: 19.96 Mean: 22.23 Mean: 23.79 Mean: 23.59 2.82***
GMDELAY Mean: 5.50 Mean: 5.94 Mean: 5.60 Mean: 5.72 Mean: 5.68 Mean: 5.21 Mean: 5.27 4.02***
LAG Mean: 0.10 Mean: 0.214 Mean: 0.121 Mean: 0.15 Mean: 0.05 Mean: 0.044 Mean: 0.04 4.62***
TENYRS Mean: 3.64 Mean: 3.30 Mean: 3.27 Mean: 3.28 Mean: 3.70 Mean: 4.04 Mean: 4.00 5.11***
TEN3 Mean: 0.522 Mean: 0.446 Mean: 0.431 Mean: 0.436 Mean: 0.45 Mean: 0.632 Mean: 0.60 4.32***
*, **, *** p  .10, .05, .01, respectively.
GCO  dummy variable: GCO  1, in case of a going concern opinion;
SALES  total sales (in thousands Belgian Francs);
LNSALES  natural logarithm of total sales;
DSCORE  general discriminant score of a standard bankruptcy model developed for Belgian companies;
BIG 6  dummy variable: BIG 6  1, in case of a Big 6 auditor;
AGE  age of the company measured in years;
GMDELAY  number of months between the closing of the ﬁscal year and the date of the annual general meeting of shareholders;
LAG  dummy variable: LAG  1, in case the number of months between the closing of the ﬁscal year and the date of the annual general meeting of
shareholders exceeds the legal maximum of six months;
TENYRS  length of the auditor-client relationship in years; and




















































































Tenure  3 years 121 174
Going concern report 22 (18.2%) 62 (35.6%) 0.001*** 8 (19.5%) 14 (17.5%) 16 (41%) 46 (34.1%)
No going concern report 99 (81.8%) 112 (64.4%) 33 (80.5%) 66 (82.5%) 23 (59%) 89 (65.9%)
Tenure  3 years 188 135
Going concern report 18 (9.6%) 50 (37%) 0.000*** 8 (15.7%) 10 (7.3%) 11 (55%) 39 (33.9%)
No going concern report 170 (90.4%) 85 (63%) 43 (84.3%) 127 (92.7%) 9 (45%) 76 (66.1%)
F-test (2-sided) 0.037** 0.812 0.783 0.041** 0.409 0.999
**, *** p  .05, .01, respectively (2-sided).The Relationship between Auditor Tenure and Audit Quality 123
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tenure for both the GCO and non-GCO ﬁrms is similar: 3.30 versus 3.27 years. However,
within the nonbankrupt sample, the auditor tenure for ﬁrms not receiving a GCO report is
longer than those receiving a GCO report: 4.04 versus 3.70 years. This result is magniﬁed
when auditor tenure is transformed into TEN3, with 63.2 percent of ﬁrms not receiving a
GCO report having their auditor more than three years, compared to 45 percent for ﬁrms
receiving a GCO report.
Table 2 provides additional information about the bankrupt and nonbankrupt samples
classiﬁed by auditor tenure. Bankrupt companies are signiﬁcantly more likely to receive a
going concern opinion compared to nonbankrupt companies, both for the subsample of
companies with auditor tenure less than three years (35.6 percent versus 18.2 percent, p
 .001) and for the subsample of companies with auditor tenure of more than three years
(37.0 percent versus 9.6 percent, p  .000). We see that the likelihood of a bankrupt
company receiving a going concern opinion is not affected by auditor tenure (35.6 percent
versus 37.0 percent). Also, the likelihood of a Big 6 ﬁrm issuing a going concern opinion
is not signiﬁcantly affected by tenure (41 percent versus 55 percent); nor does the likelihood
for a non-Big 6 ﬁrm depend on tenure (34.1 percent versus 33.9 percent).
Nonbankrupt companies are twice as likely to have received a going concern opinion
if tenure was less than three years (18.2 percent versus 9.6 percent, p  .037), hinting that
a tenure effect may be present for nonbankrupt ﬁrms. We see that this difference is due to
the non-Big 6 ﬁrms, which issue signiﬁcantly more going concern opinions to nonbankrupt
companies if auditor tenure is less than three years (17.5 percent versus 7.3 percent). How-
ever, the rate of going concern opinions for Big 6 ﬁrms is not signiﬁcantly affected by
tenure alone (19.5 percent versus 15.7 percent). Taken together, the descriptive results
suggest (1) that a non-Big 6 ﬁrm is more likely to issue a going concern report to a
nonbankrupt company when tenure is shorter and (2) there is no evidence of a relationship
between tenure and going concern opinions in the bankrupt sample.
Logistic Regression Results
The Pearson Correlation Matrix for all variables is presented in Table 3. The highest
pairwise correlations are less than .166 (excluding the obvious high correlation between
TENYRS and TEN3) and the largest variance inﬂation factors are less than 1.06. As a result,
we conclude that there are no problems of multicollinearity in the data. The results for the
logistic regression model are reported in Table 4 for the bankrupt and nonbankrupt samples
using the two proxies for auditor tenure (TEN3, TENYRS). We observe that there are qual-
itative differences between the bankrupt and nonbankrupt samples since different control
variables are signiﬁcant in the two samples.
For both models that use the bankrupt sample, issuance of a going concern opinion is
less likely for larger companies (LNSALES) and for companies that are more ﬁnancially
healthy (DSCORE), while being more likely if the shareholder’s meeting has been delayed
(LAG). AGE and BIG6 are not signiﬁcant in the models for the bankrupt sample. Of most
interest is the fact that neither TEN3 nor TENYRS is signiﬁcant in the bankrupt sample.
This result suggests that auditor tenure does not affect the likelihood that an auditor issues
a going concern opinion in the sample of bankrupt companies and is consistent with H1.
For the nonbankrupt models, the issuance of a going concern opinion is less likely for
healthier companies (DSCORE). No other control variables are signiﬁcant in the model for
the nonbankrupt sample. The continuous form of our test variable, TENYRS, is not signif-
icant in the nonbankrupt sample. However, the dichotomous variable, TEN3, is signiﬁcant
and negative (p  .05). Since the companies in this sample did not go bankrupt, it is
arguable that the negative relationship between TEN3 and GCO means that auditors are124 Knechel and Vanstraelen
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TABLE 3
Pearson Correlation Matrix


















































LNSALES  natural logarithm of total sales;
LAG  dummy variable: LAG  1, in case the number of months between the closing of the ﬁscal year
and the date of the annual general meeting of shareholders exceeds the legal maximum of six
months;
TENYRS  length of the auditor-client relationship in years;
TEN3  dummy variable: TEN3  1, in case length of auditor-client relationship is more than three years;
DSCORE  general discriminant score of a standard bankruptcy model developed for Belgian companies;
BIG 6  dummy variable: BIG 6  1, in case of a Big 6 auditor; and
AGE  age of the company measured in years.
more often making the correct decision not to issue a going concern report, consistent with
H2.
Taken together, these results do not point to a decrease in audit quality as auditor tenure
lengthens, since auditor tenure does not lead to fewer going concern opinions when the
company goes bankrupt or more going concern opinions when the company survives. On
the contrary, we observe no effect of auditor tenure on the bankrupt sample. Also, auditor
tenure is negative and signiﬁcant for the nonbankrupt sample. Consequently, these results
indicate that an auditor’s risk of committing a Type II error (failing to signal that a company
will not continue when bankruptcy actually results) is not higher simply due to longer
auditor tenure. Furthermore, there is some evidence that the auditor’s risk of committing a
Type I error (signaling that a company will go bankrupt when it actually continues) de-
creases with auditor tenure (at least as measured by a dummy variable for tenure). Overall,
auditors do not become less independent over time nor is there strong evidence that they
become better at predicting bankruptcy.
SUPPLEMENTARY ANALYSIS
To provide additional insight into the association between auditor tenure and audit
quality, we performed a number of supplementary analyses.
Inﬂuence of Auditor Tenure on the Likelihood of an Audit Error
First, we pooled the bankrupt and nonbankrupt samples in order to directly test the ex
post accuracy of auditor going concern reports. We deﬁned ERROR as a categorical variable
with a value of 0 if (1) an auditor issues a going concern report and the company fails orThe Relationship between Auditor Tenure and Audit Quality 125
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TABLE 4
Logistic Regression Analysis for Bankrupt and Nonbankrupt Samples




















































































*, **, *** p  .10, .05, .01, respectively (1-sided).
GCO  dummy variable: GCO  1, in case of a going concern opinion;
LNSALES  natural logarithm of total sales;
LAG  dummy variable: LAG  1, in case the number of months between the closing of the ﬁscal year
and the date of the annual general meeting of shareholders exceeds the legal maximum of six
months;
DSCORE  general discriminant score of a standard bankruptcy model developed for Belgian companies;
BIG 6  dummy variable: BIG 6  1, in case of a Big 6 auditor;
AGE  age of the company measured in years;
TEN3  dummy variable: TEN3  1, in case length of auditor-client relationship is more than three years;
and
TENYRS  length of the auditor-client relationship in years.
(2) an auditor does not issue a going concern report and the company survives; or 1 if an
auditor issues a going concern report and the company survives (Type I error); or 2 if an
auditor does not issue a going concern report and the company fails (Type II error). We
then estimate the following multinomial logistic regression model:
ERROR     LENGTH   LNSALES   DSCORE   BIG6   LAG 01 2 3 4 5
  AGE  ε 6
where all other variables are as previously deﬁned.
The results of this analysis are reported in Table 5 which shows that the likelihood of
a Type II error is signiﬁcantly lower when auditor tenure is longer, whether tenure is
measured by TENYRS (0.189, p  .01) or TEN3 (0.592, p  .01). Thus, the multinomial126 Knechel and Vanstraelen
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TABLE 5
Multinomial Logistic Regression: Inﬂuence of Auditor Tenure on Audit Error
(Dependent Variable  ERROR)
Bankrupt and Nonbankrupt







































































Log likelihood 486.043 486.441
LR Chi squared 59.68 58.89
(Signiﬁcance) (0.000) (0.000)
*, **, *** p  .10, .05, .01, respectively (1-sided).
ERROR  categorical variable: ERROR  0, in case of no error; ERROR  1, in case of a Type I error; and
ERROR  2, in case of a Type II error;
LNSALES  natural logarithm of total sales;
DSCORE  general discriminant score of a standard bankruptcy model developed for Belgian companies;
BIG 6  dummy variable: BIG 6  1, in case of a Big 6 auditor;
LAG  dummy variable: LAG  1, in case the number of months between the closing of the ﬁscal year
and the date of the annual general meeting of shareholders exceeds the legal maximum of six
months;
AGE  age of the company measured in years;
TENYRS  length of the auditor-client relationship in years; and
TEN3  dummy variable: TEN3  1, in case length of auditor-client relationship is more than three years.
logistic analysis indicates that not only is audit quality not undermined by auditor tenure,
it may actually improve. Similar to the main results in Table 4, the likelihood of a Type I
error is signiﬁcantly lower when auditor tenure is longer as measured by TEN3 (0.644,
p  .05). Additionally, the multinomial logistic results suggest that Big 6 audit ﬁrms are
less likely to commit a Type II error (TENYRS, 0.760, p  .01; TEN3, 0.744, p  .01),
there is a negative association between ﬁnancial distress and a Type I error (0.284, p
 .01; 0.291, p  .01), and there is a positive relationship between company size and
Type II error (0.134, p  .05; 0.128, p  .05). The latter result is consistent with prior
literature reporting a negative association between a going concern opinion and auditor size
(e.g., Louwers 1998; Krishnan and Krishnan 1996; Mutchler 1985). Taken together, theseThe Relationship between Auditor Tenure and Audit Quality 127
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results are a bit stronger than our main results and show some improvement in audit quality
as a function of auditor tenure.
Informativeness of a Going Concern Opinion
Since a going concern opinion may be a leading indicator of insolvency, we examine
whether the accuracy of auditors’ reporting decisions vary with auditor tenure. For this
analysis, we combine the bankrupt and nonbankrupt samples and then partition the total
sample into three subsamples based on auditor tenure. In particular, we distinguish the
following tenure groups: 1–2 years, 3–4 years, and 5 or more years (5). We estimate the
impact of a going concern opinion on the likelihood of bankruptcy for each of these sub-
samples using the same control variables as before and deﬁning BANKRUPT as a dummy
variable with a value of 1 if the company went bankrupt:
BANKRUPT     LNSALES   DSCORE   BIG6   LAG 01 2 3 4
  AGE   GCO  ε 56 n
where the subscript for 6n is deﬁned as n  1 for tenure of 1–2 years, n  2 for tenure
of 3–4 years, and n  3 for tenure of 5 years.
The results of this analysis are presented in Table 6. Across the three subsamples, the
going concern opinion is positive and signiﬁcant. A cross-model comparison of the marginal
effects of the GCO coefﬁcient does not indicate a monotonically increasing relationship.10
In particular, the marginal effect of the GCO coefﬁcient is 0.236 for the subsample of 1–
2 years tenure, 0.167 for the subsample of 3–4 years tenure, and 0.425 for the subsample
of 5 or more years tenure. The marginal effect of 0.425 for the subsample of 5 or more
years tenure implies a 42.5 percent increase in the probability of bankruptcy if the company
received a GCO. We further analyze the model for the middle period of 3–4 years and
compute the marginal effect for 3 years separately from 4 years. The marginal effect of the
GCO coefﬁcient when tenure is 4 years is 0.377, which is consistent with the increasing
pattern observed for the other two subsamples. However, the marginal effect of the GCO
coefﬁcient when tenure is 3 years actually drops to 0.017. This anomalous variation in the
pattern coincides with the end of the three-year mandate period. Given that the decision to
rehire the auditor is taken at the annual shareholder’s meeting, the auditor is likely to know
whether he has been renewed before issuing the report for the third year ﬁnancial state-
ments. Consequently, the auditor’s report is unlikely to be affected by the fear of losing a
client at this point in time.11
Additional Supplementary Analyses
A possible concern about the results reported above is that the nonbankrupt companies
may not look like they are going bankrupt in spite of our sample selection process, making
it less likely that an auditor would issue a going concern report. To test the sensitivity of
our results, we eliminate all companies from the sample not considered to be failing using
the DSCORE of the bankruptcy prediction model. The results (not reported) are essentially
the same as those reported in Table 4.
10 The partial derivative of the conditional probability of bankruptcy with respect to the vector of characteristics
was computed using the mean values of the independent variable.
11 The percentage of GCO for ex-post nonbankrupt companies if auditor tenure is two, three, or four years is 14.63
percent, 20.75 percent, and 7.35 percent, respectively. This conﬁrms the higher likelihood of a GCO for an ex-
post nonbankrupt ﬁrm in case the auditor is in the third year and thus last year of his three-year audit mandate.128 Knechel and Vanstraelen
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TABLE 6
Logistic Regression Analysis: Accuracy of GCO to Predict Bankruptcy
(Dependent Variable  BANKRUPT)































































*, **, *** p  .10, .05, .01, respectively (1-sided).
BANKRUPT  dummy variable: BANKRUPT  1, in case of a bankrupt company;
LNSALES  natural logarithm of total sales;
DSCORE  general discriminant score of a standard bankruptcy model developed for Belgian companies;
BIG 6  dummy variable: BIG 6  1, in case of a Big 6 auditor;
LAG  dummy variable: LAG  1, in case the number of months between the closing of the ﬁscal year
and the date of the annual general meeting of shareholders exceeds the legal maximum of six
months;
AGE  age of the company measured in years; and
GCO  dummy variable: GCO  1, in case of a going concern opinion.
The professional obligation of auditors to consider whether a company will be a going
concern is restricted to 12 months. Hence, our initial sample of nonbankrupt companies
was based on a company surviving for at least a year. We reran our analysis of the non-
bankrupt sample after dropping companies that went bankrupt within two years of the audit
report and found no qualitative difference in the results when compared to Table 4 (results
not reported).
Considering the possibility that very young companies may be more likely to receive
a going concern report because they are less likely to survive, we removed all companies
that were less than ﬁve years old. The results based on the reduced samples were not
qualitatively different from those reported in Table 4 (results not reported).
Big 6 and non-Big 6 ﬁrms are often perceived to represent different levels of audit
quality (Menon and Williams 1991). Consequently, a company that receives a going concern
opinion may be more likely to go bankrupt if the auditor is a Big 6 ﬁrm. To remove the
effect of this difference from the likelihood of bankruptcy, we reran our logistical model
on four subsamples, separating the companies by ﬁrm and bankruptcy (results not reported).The Relationship between Auditor Tenure and Audit Quality 129
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These results essentially conﬁrm our prior analysis that the effect of auditor tenure is
primarily observed in the nonbankrupt group, both for Big 6 and non-Big 6 ﬁrms.
In Belgium, legal requirements dictate that an auditor be hired for three years, during
which time the auditor cannot be ﬁred from the engagement. The three-year period is
referred to as a mandate, and the same auditor can be hired for sequential mandate periods.
As a ﬁnal supplemental test, we examine the effect of mandate period by rerunning the
analysis without either TEN3 or TENYRS. Instead, we used two dummy variables: one for
an audit in the second mandate period and one for an audit in the third (or higher) mandate
period. The results are consistent with the results we obtained for TEN3 and TENYRS.
CONCLUSIONS, DISCUSSION, AND LIMITATIONS
In this paper, we examine the relationship between auditor tenure and audit quality in
an environment where an auditor’s incentives tend to favor avoiding disputes with a client
so as to avoid loss of the client, i.e., private ﬁrms in Belgium. If there is a negative effect
of long tenure on audit quality, this is an environment where such a phenomena is most
likely to be observed. Using a sample of stressed bankrupt companies, our results reveal
that there is no increase in Type II error rate (63.75 percent in our sample) arising from
auditor tenure. That is, we observe no loss of auditor independence as a result of lengthy
auditor tenure. Using a sample of stressed nonbankrupt companies, our results suggest that
Type I error rates (12.94 percent in our sample) are lower when auditor tenure is longer.
Furthermore, the multinomial logistic regression results reveal some improvement in audit
effectiveness as a function of auditor tenure as measured by a reduced rate of Type II error
(i.e., failing to issue an opinion to a company that subsequently goes bankrupt). However,
on balance, the evidence for auditor tenure either increasing or decreasing audit quality is
weak. The results of this paper should be interpreted with some possible limitations in
mind, relating to the generalizability of the results. First, the data comes from a country
that has different regulations and accounting rules than the U.S. or U.K. Second, the com-
panies used in the sample are not publicly listed and generally smaller than used in most
prior research. Nevertheless, given that this is an environment where audit tenure is most
likely to undermine an auditor’s judgment, the results refute the contention that long-term
auditor-client relationships undermine audit quality.
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